Use-Cases for Private Information Retrieval and Secure Multiparty Computation in Modern Network Architecture

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Context



Design Choices for a Civil Network!

Internet Design Goals (David Clark, 1988)

- 1. Internet communication must continue despite loss of networks or gateways.
- 2. The Internet must support multiple types of communications service.
- 3. The Internet architecture must accommodate a variety of networks.
- 4. The Internet architecture must permit *distributed management* of its resources.
- 5. The Internet architecture must be cost effective.
- 6. The Internet architecture must permit host attachment with a low level of effort.
- 7. The resources used in the internet architecture must be accountable.

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GNUnet Design Goals

- 1. GNUnet must be implemented as Free Software.
- 2. GNUnet must minimize the amount of personally identifiable information exposed.
- The GNUnet must be fully distributed and resilient to external attacks and rogue participants.
- 4. GNUnet must be self-organizing and not depend on administrators or centralized infrastructure.
- GNUnet must inform the user which other participants have to be trusted when establishing private communications.
- 6. GNUnet must be open and permit new peers to join.
- 7. GNUnet must support a diverse range of applications and devices.
- GNUnet must use compartmentalization to protect sensitive information.
- 9. The GNUnet architecture must be resource efficient.
- 10. GNUnet must provide incentives for peers to contribute more resources than they consume.

Applications in GNUnet (under development)

- Anonymous and non-anonymous publishing
- IPv6–IPv4 protocol translation and tunnelling
- ► GNU Name System: censorship-resistant replacement for DNS
- Conversation: secure, decentralized voice communication
- SecuShare: social networking
- GNU Taler: privacy-friendly payments

► ...

Part I: Private Information Retrieval

Back to the Internet: DNS troubles

- DNS remains a source of traffic amplification for DDoS
- ▶ DNS censorship (i.e. by China) causes collateral damage in other countries
- DNS is part of the mass surveillance apparatus (MCB)
- DNS is abused for the offensive cyber war (QUANTUMDNS)

Band aid solutions¹ will **not** fix this.

¹DNS-over-TLS, DoH, DNSSEC, DPRIVE, ... Use-Cases for PIR and SMC

The GNU name system²

- ▶ Decentralized name system ⇒ Names are not global
- Supports globally unique (& secure) identification
- Achieves query and response privacy
- Provides public key infrastructure
- Interoperable with DNS

 $^{^2} Joint work with Martin Schanzenbach, Matthias Wachs and Patrick Gerber Use-Cases for PIR and SMC$

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Name resolution in GNS



Bob can now reach his Web server under www.bob

Secure Introduction



Bob provides his public key to his friends, i.e. via QR code

Delegation



- Alice learns Bob's "public" key
- Alice creates a delegation to zone K_{pub}^{Bob} under the label **bob**
- Alice can then reach Bob's Web server under www.bob.alice































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Browser Usage



Privacy issue: DHT



Terminology

- G generator in ECC curve, a point
- *n* size of ECC group, n := |G|, *n* prime
- *x* private ECC key of zone ($x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$)
- *P* public key of zone, a point P := xG
- *l* label for record in a zone ($l \in \mathbb{Z}_n$)
- $R_{P,l}$ set of records for label *l* in zone *P*
- $q_{P,l}$ query hash (hash code for DHT lookup)
- $B_{P,l}$ block with encrypted information for label *l* in zone *P* published in the DHT under $q_{P,l}$

Private Information Retrieval

Publishing records $R_{P,l}$ as $B_{P,l}$ under key $q_{P,l}$

$$\begin{aligned} h &:= H(l, P) & (1) \\ d &:= h \cdot x \mod n & (2) \\ B_{P,l} &:= S_d(E_{HKDF(l, P)}(R_{P, l})), dG & (3) \\ q_{P,l} &:= H(dG) & (4) \end{aligned}$$

Private Information Retrieval

Publishing records $R_{P,l}$ as $B_{P,l}$ under key $q_{P,l}$

$$h := H(l, P)$$
(1)

$$d := h \cdot x \mod n$$
(2)

$$B_{P,l} := S_d(E_{HKDF(l,P)}(R_{P,l})), dG$$
(3)

$$q_{P,l} := H(dG)$$
(4)

Searching for records under label *l* in zone *P*

$$h := H(l, P)$$

$$q_{Pl} := H(hP) = H(hxG) = H(dG) \Rightarrow \text{obtain } B_{Pl}$$
(5)
(6)

$$R_{P,l} = D_{HKDF(l,P)}(B_{P,l})$$
(7)

Part II: Secure Multiparty Computation

Core features of social networking applications

- Users create profiles and messages ("user-generated content")
- Users connect to each other and/or subscribe to channels
- Communication happens over those connections

Why?

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Why?

Management of information overload via collaborative filtering

Application Domains

Business







diaspora*



tinder

Ggnusocial

Architectures for Social Networks







Decentralized





diaspora*

matrix







Secure Multiparty Computation

- ▶ Alice and Bob have private inputs *a_i* and *b_i*.
- Alice and Bob run a protocol to collaboratively compute $f(a_i, b_i)$.
- Only one of them learns the result
- Adversary model: honest but curious

Collaborative Filtering \equiv Scalar product

Motivation

► Scalarproduct ⇒ Cosinus-Similarity:

Collaborative Filtering \equiv Scalar product

Motivation

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► Scalarproduct ⇒ Cosinus-Similarity:

$$\vec{a} \stackrel{\uparrow}{\underbrace{\theta}}_{\bullet} \stackrel{\bullet}{\overrightarrow{b}} \stackrel{\bullet}{\underbrace{\theta}} \stackrel{\bullet}{\underbrace{\theta}}$$

Properties

- Private inputs remain protected (given limited number of interactions)
- Efficient in bandwidth and computation

The Protocol³

Alice's public key is $A = g^a$, her private key is a. Alices sends to Bob $(g_i, h_i) = (g^{r_i}, g^{r_i a + a_i})$ with random values r_i for $i \in M$. Bob replies with:

$$\left(\prod_{i\in M}g_i^{b_i},\prod_{i\in M}h_i^{b_i}\right) = \left(\prod_{i\in M}g_i^{b_i},(\prod_{i\in M}g_i^{b_i})^a g^{\sum_{i\in M}a_ib_i}\right)$$

Alice can then compute:

$$\left(\prod_{i\in M}g_i^{b_i}\right)^{-a}\cdot\left(\prod_{i\in M}g_i^{b_i}\right)^a\cdot g^{\sum_{i\in M}a_ib_i}=g^{\sum_{i\in M}a_ib_i}.$$

If $\sum_{i \in M} a_i b_i$ is sufficiently small, Alice can efficiently compute the scalar product by solving the DLP.

³Joint work with Tanja Lange Use-Cases for PIR and SMC

Preliminary experimental results

Länge	ECC-2 ²⁰	ECC-2 ²⁸
25	2 s	29 s
50	2 s	29 s
100	2 s	29 s
200	3 s	30 s

The pre-computation for ECC-2²⁸ is ×16 more expensive than for ECC-2²⁰, as the table grows with \sqrt{n} .

Conclusion

- GNU name system is a PKI using private information retrieval
- SMC can be used to efficiently perform collaborative filtering
- Cryptography can help us build better privacy-preserving decentralized networks!

This was **only** a short introduction. GNUnet includes other cool cryptographic protocols.

Questions?

Literature:

- Matthias Wachs, Martin Schanzenbach and Christian Grothoff. A Censorship-Resistant, Privacy-Enhancing and Fully Decentralized Name System.
 13th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security, 2014.
- Geert Lovink and Miriam Rasch. Unlike Us Reader: Social Media Monopolies and their Alternatives. Institute of Network Cultures, 2013.
- John Naughton. Death by drone strike, dished out by algorithm, The Guardian, 21.2.2016.
- Lee Fang. The CIA is investing in firms that mine your Tweets and Instagram photos. The Intercept, 14.4.2016.

More Information on the Web:

- https://gnunet.org/
- https://taler.net/
- https://grothoff.org/christian/