COMP 3704 Computer Security

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Design Criteria for Hash Functions

- $H: \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$ for fixed $m \in \mathbb{N}$ and any $n \in \mathbb{N}$
- Given M, it is easy to compute h = H(M)
- Given h, it is hard to find an M such that H(M) = h
- \bullet Given M, it is hard to find an $M' \neq M$ such that H(M) = H(M')
- \bullet It is hard to find random messages M and $M' \neq M$ such that H(M) = H(M')



Birthday Attack!

Probability of not finding a *n*-bit collision after generating $2^{n/2}$ messages is less than 50%:

$$p(k) = \prod_{i=0}^{k} \left(1 - \frac{i}{2^{n}} \right)$$
(1)
$$\approx \prod_{i=0}^{k} e^{\frac{-i}{2^{n}}}$$
(2)
$$= e^{-\frac{(k(k-1))}{2^{n+1}}}$$
(3)



General Construction

Difficult to define function $H : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$. Instead use:

$$h_i = f(M_i, h_{i-1})$$
 (4)

 $f: \{0,1\}^b \times \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ for a fixed b is called a **compression function**.



General Implementation



Example: MD5




Figure 1: MD5 consists of four rounds of 16 operations.



MD5 Functions

$$F(X, Y, Z) = (X \land Y) \lor (\neg X \land Z)$$

$$G(X, Y, Z) = (X \land Y) \lor (Y \land \neg Z)$$

$$H(X, Y, Z) = X \oplus Y \oplus Z$$

$$I(X, Y, Z) = Y \oplus (X \lor \neg Z)$$
(8)




Common Hash Functions

- MD5 128 bits
- RIPE160MD 160 bits
- SHA1 128 bits
- SHA-2 256-512 bits
- WHIRLPOOL 512 bits



Miyaguchi-Preneel Constructions



Example: WHIRLPOOL = Miyaguchi-Preneel + AES



Successful Attacks

- SHA-1: collisions found in 2005
- MD4, MD5 and RIPEMD-128: collisions found in 2004
- \Rightarrow Use 256 or more bits



Password Crackers

- Passwords do not usually have 128-bits of entropy
- We could actually compute hash codes for all 2^{64} "realistic" passwords (8 ASCII characters)
- However, we could not store all 2^{64} values

 \Rightarrow Precompute and use space-computation trade-off when cracking!



Precomputed Hash Chains

- \bullet Have set P of realistic passwords and domain D of H
- Define **reduction** function $F: D \to P$
- Pre-compute chains X(I) = H(F(H(F(H(F(H(I))))))) for many I
- When cracking C, check if C = X(I) or H(F(C)) = X(I) or H(F(...(H(F(C))))) = X(I).
- \Rightarrow reduce storage space by chain length L at the expense of O(L) more computation during cracking.



Problems with Hash Chains

- $\bullet~F$ can cause collisions in two chains, merging the chains
- Collisions reduce effectiveness of table construction (to often less than 70%) and bound chain length
- \Rightarrow Tables are much too big!
- \Rightarrow Some chains are discarded as ineffective
- \Rightarrow Wasted time during construction!
- \Rightarrow Possibility of "false alarms"



Rainbow Tables

- Key idea: use different functions F_i in chain
- Pre-compute chains $X(I) = H(F_3(H(F_2(H(F_1(H(I))))))))$
- \Rightarrow Collisions only merge chains if they also happen at same position
- \Rightarrow Can achieve 99% effectiveness
- \Rightarrow Cracking overhead increases from O(L) to $O(L^2)$ for chain traversal
- \Rightarrow Cracking overhead decreases from O(L) to O(1) due to fewer chains



Defense: Salt!

- hash = H(password + salt)
- Extends length of the password
- Rainbow tables commonly only support 8 characters
- \Rightarrow Add 16 characters (or more) of salt



Reality

- UNIX NIS/YP/shadow: salted for a long time
- Windows NT/2000 LAN Manager: unsalted, easily cracked



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Questions





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Exercise

Generate a rainbow table (and password cracker) for SHA1 that can invert passwords of up to 5 characters (A-Za-z).

You may link against libgcrypt or OpenSSL for hashing.

