#### **COMP 3400** Mainframe Administration<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>These slides are based in part on materials provided by IBM's Academic Initiative.



### **Computer Security Overview**

- Computer Security  $\equiv$  protecting information
- Protecting: Integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, availability
  Information: Randomness, entropy, correlation, storage, transmission



## Topics

- Cryptography and Protocols (theory)
- System Administration (practice)
- Privacy, Policies and Legal Aspects (politics)



# Terminology (1/5)

- An <u>adversary</u> is a subject trying to break the security of a system
- A threat is a mechanism that the adversary can employ to achieve his goals
- A risk is a loss that would occur if the adversary succeeds
- A vulnerability is a flaw creating a threat
- A threat model describes the mechanisms available to the adversary
- A trust model describes subjects that are trusted not to have vulnerabilities
- A <u>security model</u> specifies functional and security goals together with threat and trust models



# Terminology (2/5)

- Plaintext: P
- Ciphertext: C
- Encryption:  $E_K(P) = C$
- Decryption:  $D_K(C) = P$
- Cryptography + Cryptanalysis = Cryptology
- Steganography



# Terminology (3/5)

- Authentication: receiver ascertains origin of message
- Integrity: verify message was not modified in transit
- Nonrepudiation: sender cannot deny sending message



# Terminology (4/5)

- Cipher = (E, D)
- $\bullet\ \underline{restricted}\ algorithm\ \equiv\ security\ based\ on\ secrecy\ of\ algorithm$
- modern algorithm  $\equiv$  security based on secrecy of key K



# Terminology (5/5)

Attacker limitations:

- Data complexity (how much data required as input to the attack)
- Processing complexity (how much processing is needed)
- Storage requirements (how much memory is needed)



## Kerckhoff's principle (1883)

The only thing the adversary does not know is the secret key.

The design of encyrption and decryption algorithms and the protocol is public:

- Allows public scrutiny of the design
- No need to replace system if design is exposed
- Same design can be used for multiple applications
- Focus on security the key!



#### Secure Voting, US-style



**KEYS TO THE KINGDOM** Photo taken from Diebold's online store. The keys that open every Diebold touch-screen voting machine. Working copies have been made from the photo.



# **Defeating the Evildoers**

#### CERT:

- 1. Install and Use Anti-Virus Programs
- 2. Keep Your System Patched
- 3. Use Care When Reading Email with Attachments
- 4. Install and Use a Firewall Program
- 5. Make Backups of Important Files and Folders
- 6. Use Strong Passwords
- 7. Use Care When Downloading and Installing Programs
- 8. Install and Use a Hardware Firewall
- 9. Install and Use a File Encryption Program and Access Controls

#### CRISP:

- 1. Use UNIX-based systems and avoid being root
- 2. Frequently update your software, it is free
- 3. Refuse to use Microsoft products and document formats
- 4. Be aware what services you run (netstat -ntpl)
- 5. Use version control for important files
- 6. Use strong passwords where necessary
- 7. Avoid using non-free software
- 8. Do not buy random security equipment
- 9. Use cryptography appropriately
- 10. Think. Sometimes, wear black hats.



### **Review: UNIX File Permissions**

- Standard permissions: Read (4), Write (2), eXecute (1)
- Differentiation by: User, Group, Others
- man chmod, man chown
- Default permissions are  $arg\&\ mask$  where arg is specified by the application. For mask, see man umask



#### **Process User Identifiers**

- Each process is associated with multiple user IDs: real, effective, saved and possibly others
- Real UID is the UID of the process that created this process. Can only be changed if effective UID is root (0).
- Effective UID is used for permission checks; EUID can be changed to real UID or to saved UID. If EUID is 0, anything goes.
- New files are created using the effective UID



## SUID, SGID

- If permissions of executable file are set to SUID, SUID of executed process will be set to UID of the file's owner.
- This allows the program to switch to those permissions using seteuid(SUID)
- Processes also have multiple group IDs, the same rules apply.
- Binaries with SUID and SGID can be used to elevate permissions



# **TCP/IP Security: Terminology**

- Stateless Firewall
- Statefull Firewall
- DMZ
- VPN



# z/OS Security

- SAF / RACF: Authorization, Authentication, Logging, Tracing
- IPSec (VPN): Encryption, Authentication
- TLS (SSL): Encryption, Authentication



## **SNA Security**

- "Security by Obscurity"
- Subarea: LU authentication, hardware based keys
- APPN: Authentication and Encryption
- EE: IP-based security
- TN3270: SAF/RACF (authentication, application restriction); TLS supported



# System Authorization Facility (SAF)

- Part of z/OS
- Central component responsible for security
- Interfaces with security manager for authentication, authorization and logging
- Control points are decision-making functions in resource managing components
- SAF "routes" requests from "control points" to the security manager



# Resource Access Control Facility (RACF)

- Most important component of IBM's implementation of a security manager
- User with the SPECIAL attribute is the security administrator
- Security manager has other important components, such as the RACF Remote Sharing Facility (RRSF)



#### **RACF Features**

- Identify and authenticate users
- Authorize users to access protected resources
- Log and report attempts of unauthorized access
- Control the means of access to resources (i.e., restrict to certain terminals, IP addresses or times of day)



#### **RACF Access Protections for Data Sets**

NONE No access at all

- **READ** Reading only (including creating copies and printing)
- **UPDATE** Reading and writing, but no deletion, renaming or moving
- ALTER Read, update, delete, rename and move allowed
- **EXECUTE** User can execute (but not read or copy) load modules in the library



#### **Other Access Protection Functions**

- Notify: if access is denied, notify a given user
- Erase-on-scratch: when the data set is deleted, overwrite all allocated extents with zeros
- Warn: allow unauthorized users access, but warn them



## **Setting Permissions**

1. Create a profile, default permissions "NONE":

ADDSD 'dataset-name' UACC(NONE)

- 2. Set permissions for a user:
  - PERMIT 'dataset-name' ID(USERNAME) ACCESS(READ)



### **Inspecting Permissions**

LISTDSD DATASET ('dataset-name') ALL

For more information on RACF, read the **z/OS Security Server RACF General User's Guide** (SA22-7685-01).



# Authorized Programs (APF)

- Similar to SUID on UNIX: allowed to perform supervisor calls (SVCs)
- Except also treated as extension to the kernel more like a kernel module
- Program Status Word (PSW) must have particular values (to indicate supervisor mode)
- APF-authorized programs must reside in authorized libraries
- SYS1.LINKLIB, SYS1.SVCLIB and SYS1.LPALIB are by default authorized libraries



#### **Storage Protection**

- Address spaces isolate programs
- $\bullet$  Page protection bit can be used to prevent z/OS and APFs from writing to pages
- $\Rightarrow$  Used for LPA pages shared across address spaces
  - Subsystems also use cross-memory communication to share memory across address spaces
  - The **program call** (PC) instruction can be used to call a program in another address space



# z/VM Security

- Integrates with RACF and other external security managers
- Used for authentication and access control (to memory pools, disks, networks (VLANs), terminals)
- Alternative: z/VM directory (build-in) instead of RACF or IBM DirMaint



## z/VM Priviledge Classes

- A System Operator: accounting, availability, performance
- B System Resource Operator: controls (most) physical resources
- C System Programmer: Changes system-wide parameters
- D Spooling Operator: Controls spool files, readers, printers and punch equipment
- E System Analyst: examines system operation data
- F Service Representative: examines I/O operation data
- G General User
- Any Available to any user
  - H Reserved for IBM use
- I-Z, 1-6 Defined through user class restructure (UCR) by each installation



# **Cryptgographic Facilities**

z/VM can provide guests with access to cryptographic co-processors (CP Assist for Cryptographic Function):

- DES
- AES
- SHA-1
- SHA-256
- Modular arithmetic (for RSA, DH)



# **CP USER DIRECT**

- The z/VM directory (USER DIRECT) is a flat file used to manage definitions of users
- CP can not directly read the flat file, DIRECTXA is used to make it accessible to CP
- User MAINT is responsible for maintaining the directory



# Updating USER DIRECT

- Log on as user MAINT
- Edit USER DIRECT with XEDIT
- Run DISKMAP to check for overlapping disk allocations
- View USER DISKMAP to see if overlaps are acceptable
- $\bullet$  Run DIRECTXA USER DIRECT to make the new directory available to z/VM



### z/VM User Directory: Example

USER LINUXO1 MYPASS 512M 1024M G MACHINE ESA 2 IPL 190 PARM AUTOCR CONSOLE 01F 3270 A SPOOL OOC 2540 READER \* SPOOL OOD 2540 PUNCH A SPECIAL 500 QDIO 3 SYSTEM MYLAN LINK MAINT 190 190 RR MDISK 191 3390 012 001 ONEBIT MW MDISK 200 3390 050 100 TWOBIT MR DFNVFR

#### Questions



