GNU Taler

A Technological Option to Save our Democracy and Economy from "Cashless" Totalitarianism

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"I think one of the big things that we need to do, is we need to get a way from true-name payments on the Internet. The credit card payment system is one of the worst things that happened for the user, in terms of being able to divorce their access from their identity." -Edward Snowden, IETF 93 (2015)



Motivation



Modern economies need currency ...



This was a question posed to RAND researchers in 1971:

"Suppose you were an advisor to the head of the KGB, the Soviet Secret Police. Suppose you are given the assignment of designing a system for the surveillance of all citizens and visitors within the boundaries of the USSR. The system is not to be too obtrusive or obvious. What would be your decision?"



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Mastercard/Visa are too transparent.



Bitcoin

- ► Unregulated payment system and currency: ⇒ lack of regulation is a feature!
- Implemented in free software
- Decentralised peer-to-peer system



Bitcoin

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 - \Rightarrow lack of regulation is a feature!
- Implemented in free software
- Decentralised peer-to-peer system
- Decentralised banking requires solving Byzantine consensus
- Creative solution: tie initial accumulation to solving consensus




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- Creative solution: tie initial accumulation to solving consensus
 - \Rightarrow Proof-of-work advances ledger
 - \Rightarrow Very expensive banking







Current average transaction value: \approx 1000 USD





Cryptography is rather primitive:

All Bitcoin transactions are public and linkable!

 \Rightarrow no privacy guarantees

 \Rightarrow enhanced with "laundering" services

ZeroCoin, CryptoNote (Monero) and ZeroCash (ZCoin) offer anonymity.



Is society ready for an anarchistic economy?



GNU Taler


Digital cash, made socially responsible.



Taxable, Anonymous, Libre, Practical, Resource Friendly



Architecture of GNU Taler





Usability of Taler

https://demo.taler.net/

- 1. Install Chrome extension.
- 2. Visit the bank.demo.taler.net to withdraw coins.
- 3. Visit the shop.demo.taler.net to spend coins.



Value proposition: Customer

- Convenient: pay with one click
- Guaranteed: never fear being rejected by false-positives in the fraud detection
- Secure: like cash, except no worries about counterfeit
- Privacy-preserving: payment requires no personal information
- Stable: no currency fluctuations, pay in traditional currencies
- Free software: no hidden "gadgets", third parties can verify



Value proposition: Merchant

- Fast: transactions at Web-speed
- Secure: signed contracts, no legitimate customer rejected by fraud decection
- Free software: competitive pricing and support
- ► Low fees: efficient protocol + no fraud = low costs
- Flexible: any currency, any amount
- Ethical: no fluctuation risk, no pyramid scheme, not suitable for illegal business
- ► Legal: complies with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)¹

¹Requires privacy by design and data minimization for all data processing in Europe after 25.5.2018.

Value proposition: Government

- Free software = commons: no monopoly, preserve independence
- Taxabiliy: reduces black markets
- Efficiency: high transaction costs hurt the economy
- Security: signed contracts, no counterfeit
- Audited: no bad banks
- Privacy: protection against foreign espionage



Taxability

We say Taler is taxable because:

- Merchant's income is visible from deposits.
- Hash of contract is part of deposit data.
- State can trace income and enforce taxation.



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Limitations:

- withdraw loophole
- sharing coins among family and friends



Merchant Integration: Wallet Detection

```
<script src="taler-wallet-lib.js"></script>
<script>
  taler.onPresent(() => {
    alert("Taler_wallet_is_installed");
  });
  taler.onAbsent(() => {
    alert("Taler_wallet_is_not_installed");
  });
</script>
```



Merchant Integration: Payment Request

```
HTTP/1.1 402 Payment Required
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
X-Taler-Contract-Url: https://shop/generate-contract/42
```

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<!-- fallback for browsers without the Taler extension -->
You do not seem to have Taler installed, here are other
payment options ...
</html>
```



Merchant Integration: Contract

{

}

```
"H_wire":"YTHOC4QBCQ10VDNTJNODCTTV2Z6JHT5NF43F0RQHZ8JYB5NG4W4G...",
"amount":{"currency":"EUR","fraction":1,"value":0},
"auditors": [{"auditor_pub": "42V6TH91Q83FB846DK1GW3JQ5E8DS273W4..."}],
"exchanges":[{"master_pub":"1T5FA8VQHMMKBHDMYPRZA2ZFK2S63AKF0Y...",
              "url":"https://exchange/"}],
"expiry":"/Date(1480119270)/",
"fulfillment_url": "https://shop/article/42?tid=249&time=14714744",
"max_fee":{"currency":"EUR","fraction":01,"value":0},
  "merchant":{"address":"Mailbox,4242","jurisdiction":"Jersey",
              "name": "Shop, Inc."},
"merchant_pub":"Y1ZAR5346J3ZTEXJCHQY9NJN78EZ2HSKZK8MOMYTNRJG5N...",
"products":[{
  "description":"Essay: "The GNU Project",
  "price":{"currency":"EUR","fraction":1,"value":0},
  "product_id":42, "quantity":1}],
"refund_deadline":"/Date(1471522470)/",
"timestamp":"/Date(1471479270)/",
"transaction_id":249960194066269
```



We use a few ancient constructions:

- Cryptographic hash function (1989)
- Blind signature (1983)
- Schnorr signature (1989)
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange (1976)
- Cut-and-choose zero-knowledge proof (1985)

But of course we use modern instantiations.



Global setup: Pick an Elliptic curve

Need:

G generator in ECC curve, a point *o* size of ECC group, o := |G|, *o* prime Now we can, for example, compute:

$$A = G + G$$

= 2G
$$B = A + G$$

= 3G
$$C = cG \text{ for } c \in \mathbb{Z}$$


Note:

$$G = (o+1)G$$



Exchange setup: Create a denomination key (RSA)


- 1. Pick random primes p, q.
- 2. Compute n := pq, $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$
- 3. Pick small $e < \phi(n)$ such that $d := e^{-1} \mod \phi(n)$ exists.
- 4. Publish public key (e, n).






Merchant: Create a signing key (EdDSA)

- pick random m mod o as private key
- M = mG public key







Customer: Create a planchet (EdDSA)

- Pick random c mod o private key
- C = cG public key










Customer: Blind planchet (RSA)

- 1. Obtain public key (e, n)
- 2. Compute m := FDH(C), m < n.
- 3. Pick blinding factor $b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$
- 4. Transmit $m' := mb^e \mod n$





Exchange: Blind sign (RSA)


transmit Customer

- 1. Receive m'.
- 2. Compute $s' := m'^d \mod n$.
- 3. Send signature s'.




Customer: Unblind coin (RSA)

- 1. Receive s'.
- 2. Compute $s := s'b^{-1} \mod n$.






Withdrawing coins on the Web






Customer: Build shopping cart





Merchant: Propose contract (EdDSA)



- 1. Complete proposal D.
- 2. Send D, $EdDSA_m(D)$

Customer: Spend coin (EdDSA)

- transmit transmit Merchant
 - loría 🖓 🗯

- 1. Receive proposal D, $EdDSA_m(D)$.
- 2. Send s, C, $EdDSA_c(D)$


Merchant and Exchange: Verify coin (RSA)

$$s^e \stackrel{?}{\equiv} m \mod n$$





Payment processing with Taler





Giving change

It would be inefficient to pay EUR 100 with 1 cent coins!

- Denomination key represents value of a coin.
- Exchange may offer various denominations for coins.
- Wallet may not have exact change!
- Usability requires ability to pay given sufficient total funds.



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- Key goals:
 - maintain unlinkability
 - maintain taxability of transactions



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Method:

- Contract can specify to only pay *partial value* of a coin.
- Exchange allows wallet to obtain *unlinkable change* for remaining coin value.



Strawman solution

Given partially spent private coin key c_{old} :

1. Pick random $c_{new} \mod o$ private key


2.
$$C_{new} = c_{new}G$$
 public key

3. Pick random b_{new}

4. Compute
$$m_{new} := FDH(C_{new})$$
, $m < n_{ew}$

5. Transmit
$$m'_{new} := m_{new} b^e_{new} \mod n$$

... and sign request for change with c_{old} .





Strawman solution


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


Problem: Owner of c_{new} may differ from owner of c_{old} !



Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

- 1. Create private keys $d, h \mod o$
- 2. Define D = dG
- 3. Define H = hG
- 4. Compute DH := d(hD) = h(dH)





Customer: Transfer key setup (ECDH)

Given partially spent private coin key cold:


- 1. Let $C_{old} := c_{old} G$ (as before)
- 2. Create random private transfer key $t \mod o$
- 3. Compute T := tG

4. Compute
$$X := c_{old}(tG) = t(c_{old}G) = tC_{old}$$


5. Derive c_{new} and b_{new} from X

- 6. Compute $C_{new} := c_{new} G$
- 7. Compute $m_{new} := FDH(C_{new})$

8. Transmit
$$m'_{new} := m_{new} b^e_{new}$$



Cut-and-Choose



Exchange: Choose!

Exchange sends back random $\gamma \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ to the customer.





Customer: Reveal

1. If
$$\gamma = 1$$
, send t_2 , t_3 to exchange
2. If $\gamma = 2$, send t_1 , t_3 to exchange
3. If $\gamma = 3$, send t_1 , t_2 to exchange




Exchange: Verify ($\gamma = 2$)








Exchange: Blind sign change (RSA)






Customer: Unblind change (RSA)





Exchange: Allow linking change






Customer: Link (threat!)

- 1. Have *cold*.
- 2. Obtain T_{γ} , s from exchange

3. Compute
$$X_{\gamma} = c_{old} T_{\gamma}$$

- 4. Derive $c_{new,\gamma}$ and $b_{new,\gamma}$ from X_{γ}
- 5. Unblind $s := s' b_{new,\gamma}^{-1} \mod n$




Refresh protocol summary

- Customer asks exchange to convert old coin to new coin
- Protocol ensures new coins can be recovered from old coin
- \Rightarrow New coins are owned by the same entity!
- Thus, the refresh protocol allows:
 - To give unlinkable change.
 - To give refunds to an anonymous customer.
 - To expire old keys and migrate coins to new ones.

Transactions via refresh are equivalent to sharing a wallet.



Operational security





Competitor comparison

	Cash	Bitcoin	Zerocoin	Creditcard	GNU Taler
Online		++	++	+	+++
Offline	+++			+	
Trans. cost	+			_	++
Speed	+			0	++
Taxation	-			+++	+++
Payer-anon	++	0	++		+++
Payee-anon	++	0	++		
Security	-	0	0		++
Conversion	+++			+++	+++
Libre	-	+++	+++		+++



Current technical developments

- Improving wallet (error handling, features, browser support)
- Ongoing work on exchange auditing
- Tutorial for merchants
- Tutorial for Web shop integration

https://api.taler.net/



- Current wallet only works for browsers and the Web.
- Protocol should work fine also over NFC.
 - \Rightarrow Write App for mobile phones and do POS integration!



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- Current documentation is mostly in English.
 - \Rightarrow Join our team and help with translations!



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- Exchange needs to be a legal (!) business to operate.
- Exchange operator income is from *transaction fees*.

 \Rightarrow Find funding and create a startup!



Conclusion

What can we do?

- Suffer mass-surveillance enabled by credit card oligopolies with high fees, and
- Engage in arms race with deliberately unregulatable blockchains, and
- Enjoy the "benefits" of cash



OR

Establish free software alternative balancing social goals!



Do you have any questions?


References:

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- David Chaum, Amos Fiat and Moni Naor. Untraceable electronic cash. Proceedings on Advances in Cryptology, 1990.
- 6. Phillip Rogaway. The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work. Asiacrypt, 2015.

Let money facilitate trade; but ensure capital serves society.



Taler /withdraw/sign




Result: $\langle c, S_{DK}(C) \rangle$.

- A Some amount, $A \ge A_{DK}$
- RK Reserve key
- DK Denomination key
 - b Blinding factor
- Bb() RSA-FDH blinding
 - C Coin public key C := cG
- S_{RK}() EdDSA signature
- S_{DK}() RSA-FDH signature



Taler /deposit


Merchant and exchange see only the public coin $\langle C, S_{DK}(C) \rangle$.



DK	Denomination key
<i>S_{DK}()</i>	RSA-FDH signature using DK
с	Private coin key, $C := cG$.
$S_C()$	EdDSA signature using c
D	Deposit details
SK	Exchange's signing key
S _{SK} ()	EdDSA signature using SK
D'	Conficting deposit details $D' \neq D$



Taler /refresh/melt




- κ System-wide security parameter, usually 3.
- $$\begin{split} \mathcal{DK} &:= [DK^{(i)}]_i \\ \text{List of denomination keys} \\ D + \sum_i A_{DK}(i) < A_{DK} \\ t_j & \text{Random scalar for } j < \kappa \\ \mathcal{T} &:= [T_j]_\kappa \text{ where } T_j = t_j G \\ k_j &:= cT_j = t_j C \text{ is an ECDHE} \\ b_j^{(i)} &:= KDF_b(k_j, i) \\ c_j^{(i)} &:= c_j^{(i)} G \\ \mathcal{B} &:= [H(\beta_j)]_\kappa \text{ where} \\ \beta_j &:= \left[B_{b_j^{(i)}}(C_j^{(i)}) \right]_i \end{aligned}$$

Random value in $[0, \kappa)$

 \sim



Taler /refresh/reveal




$$\begin{split} \mathcal{D}\mathcal{K} &:= [D\mathcal{K}^{(i)}]_i \\ t_j & .. \\ \mathcal{\bar{T}} &:= [t_j | j \in \kappa, j \neq \gamma] \\ k_\gamma &:= cT_\gamma = t_\gamma C \\ b_\gamma^{(i)} &:= \mathcal{K}DF_b(k_\gamma, i) \\ c_\gamma^{(i)} &:= \mathcal{K}DF_c(k_\gamma, i) \\ C_\gamma^{(i)} &:= c_\gamma^{(i)} G \\ \mathcal{B}_\gamma^{(i)} &:= \mathcal{B}_{b_\gamma^{(i)}}(C_\gamma^{(i)}) \\ \beta_\gamma &:= [\mathcal{B}_\gamma^{(i)}]_i \\ \mathcal{S} &:= \left[\mathcal{S}_{D\mathcal{K}}(i)(\mathcal{B}_\gamma^{(i)})\right]_i \end{split}$$

Z Cut-and-choose missmatch information



Taler /refresh/link



- C Old coind public key
- T_{γ} Linkage data \mathcal{L} at γ

