Peer-to-Peer Systems and Security

Security

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"It's not good enough to have a system where everyone (using the system) must be trusted, it must also be made robust against insiders!" – Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA)

Peer-to-Peer Systems and Security

- In a *pure* P2P system, everyone is an insider

$\Rightarrow$ No other peer can be trusted — for anything

$\Rightarrow$ No certificate authorities, trust anchors, etc.

$\Rightarrow$ Achieving any kind of security is very hard!

Basic adversary characteristics

- Position
  - External: “sits” on the wire
  - Internal: participates in the system
- Geographic
  - Global: sits on all wires
  - Local: sits on some local wires
  - Partial: controls parts of the network
- Participation
  - Passive: only observes traffic
  - Active: may send, modify, and drop messages

Typical Adversary Models

- Global Passive Adversary (GPA)
  - Observes and analyses the complete network
  - No active participation in the network
  - External attacker
- Global Active Adversary
  - Also performs active attacks
- Partial Passive Adversary (PPA)
  - Observes only parts ($<<$ 50%) of the network
  - External attacker
- PPA or GPA with some active nodes
- Local observer

Cryptographic Primitives

- Random number generation
- Hashing
- Symmetric encryption
- Asymmetric encryption

Look at `gnunet_crypto_lib.h` if you need any of those.

Detour: Elliptic Curves

- Modern Public-Key crypto
- $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$
- $0 = (\infty, \infty)$



Elliptic Curve Point Addition



Elliptic Curve Cryptography

- If we can calculate $P + P$, we can calculate dP for $d \in \mathbb{N}$
- Pick discrete curve over $\mathbb{F}_p$
- Find generator G of order n (n minimal such that $nG = 0$)
- (p, a, b, G, n) identifies the curve
- $d \in \mathbb{F}_n$ is the private key
- $Q := dG$ is the public key
- Can now do DH and DSA (called ECDH and ECDSA)

Security Goals

- Availability
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Authenticity

P2P Authentication

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- Public key $\equiv$ identity ($ID_x := H(PK_x)$)
- Alice can then sign her messages: $A, PK_A, S_A(M)$

Such identifiers are called "cryptographic identifiers" (or self-certifying identifiers).

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Theorem (Boyd's Theorem I)

"Suppose that a user has either a confidentiality channel to her, or an authentication channel from her, at some state of the system. Then in the previous state of the system such a channel must also exist. By an inductive argument, such a channel exists at all previous states."

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Thus, no secure channels may be formed between any users who do not already possess secret or shared keys.

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$\Rightarrow$ No secure, in-system authentication without trusted third parties or prior contacts.

Authentication without Authorities

- Add out-of-band mechanisms (i.e. GNUnet F2F mode)
- Use social properties (security graph $\Leftrightarrow$ social network graph)
- Use network properties (i.e. IP address)
- Key continuity / baby duck — assume first contact to be secure (i.e. `ssh`)
- Group decisions
- ...

Zfone Authentication (ZRTP) [3]

Idea: combine human interaction proof and baby duck approach:

- A and B perform Diffie-Hellman exchange
- Keying material from previous sessions is used (duckling)
- Short Authentication String (SAS) is generated (hash of DH numbers)
- Both users read the SAS to each other, recognize voice

A man-in-the-middle attacker usually needs to intercept and change the Diffie-Hellman numbers to perform the attack on the initial exchange.

$\Rightarrow$ ZRTP foils standard man-in-the-middle attack.

Trust vs. Authentication

In open P2P networks, we care less about who operates a peer.
We want to know if a peer will behave:

- Will a peer follow the protocol?
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We can never be **sure** about a peer ...

- keeping our secrets once we expose them
- being our “friend”

Trust

The term “trust” can be used with slightly different meanings:

- A **trusted party** is a party that we trust completely for particular operations (within the technical system) — we assume correct behaviour with respect to protocol and data usage.
- Trust can also be used to imply **authorization** — we trust a party (such as a human or organization) with important or private information.

A related issue is **revocation**, the removal of authorization or the withdrawing of the special trusted party status from some party.

Incentives

- Incentives are mechanisms to make a peer cooperate by giving benefits

$\Rightarrow$ BitTorrent's tit-for-tat gives uploaders increased download rates

Reputation

- Trust into a service or peer based on experience or a-priori knowledge
- Global: reputation is system-wide
- Local: each node locally computes a reputation value for each other node
- GNUnet file-sharing's “respect” in other peers is a local reputation

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Reputation requires **observation**, **evaluation**, **storage** and **predictability**.

Attacks on Reputation

- Time-dependency — attacker may behave well for a while, then change behavior (Ebay attack)
- Whitewashing — badly-rated peer leaves and returns with new “innocent” identity
- Collusion of attackers — attackers give each other good ratings

Sybil Attack

Background:

- Ancient Greece: Sybils were prophetesses that phrophesized under the devine influence of a deity. Note: At the time of prophecy not the person but a god was speaking through the lips of the sybil.
- 1973: Flora Rheta Schreiber published a book Sybil about a woman with 16 separate personalities.

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The Sybil Attack [1]:

- Insert a node multiple times into a network, each time with a different identity
- Position a node for next step on attack:
  - Attack connectivity of the network
  - Attack replica set
  - In case of majority votes, be the majority.

Defending against Sybil Attacks

- Use authentication with trusted party that limits identity creation
- Use "external" identities (IP address, MAC, e-mail)
- Use "expensive" identities (solve computational puzzles, require payment)

Douceur: Without trusted authority to certify identities, no realistic approach exists to completely stop the Sybil attack.

Sybil Defense: The Bootstrap Graph

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In the bootstrap tree, nodes are a child of the node they used to bootstrap:



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$\Rightarrow$ Bootstrap node must enforce access control policies, i.e. based on social relationships

Sybil Defense: SybilGuard [4]

- Sybil nodes primarily know each other

⇒ Small cut between subgraph of honest nodes and subgraph of Sybils.



Eclipse Attack: Goal

- Separate a node or group of nodes from the rest of the network
- isolate peers (DoS, surveillance) or isolate data (censorship)



Eclipse Attack: Techniques

- Use Sybil attack to increase number of malicious nodes
- Take over routing tables, peer discovery

⇒ Details depend on overlay structure

Defenses

- Large number of connections
- Replication
- Diverse neighbour selection (different IP subnets, geographic locations)
- Aggressive discovery ("continuous" bootstrap)
- Audit neighbour behaviour (if possible)
- Prefer long-lived connections / old peers

Poisoning Attacks

Peers can provide false information:

- wrong routing tables
- wrong meta data
- wrong index information
- wrong performance measurements

Timing Attacks [2]

Peers can:

- measure latency to determine origin of data
- delay messages
- send messages using particular timing patterns to aid correlation
- include wrong timestamps (or just have the wrong time set...)

Questions?

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