BTI 7252: Information Security and Politics

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The GNU Project

October 1, 2017

"The means of defense against foreign danger historically have become the instruments of tyranny at home." –James Madison

Mass Surveillance

(U) What is TREASUREMAP?

(U//FOUO) Capability for building a near real-time, interactive map of the global internet.

Map the entire Internet – Any device*, anywhere, all the time

(U//FOUO) We enable a wide range of missions:

- Cyber Situational Awareness – *your own network plus adversaries'*
- Common Operation Pictures (COP)
- Computer Attack/Exploit Planning / Preparation of the Environment
- Network Reconnaissance
- Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)

(* limited only by available data)

"Wer nicht mit hinreichender Sicherheit überschauen kann, welche ihn betreffende Informationen in bestimmten Bereichen seiner sozialen Umwelt bekannt sind, und wer das Wissen möglicher Kommunikationspartner nicht einigermaßen abzuschätzen vermag, kann in seiner Freiheit wesentlich gehemmt werden, aus eigener Selbstbestimmung zu planen oder zu entscheiden."
*—Bundesverfassungsgericht zum Volkszählungsurteil*

Commercial tools: The crime fighting genie!

http://www.stealthgenie.com/ (6'2013)

"Wir sind die Guten." —Die Anstalt

Risks of Mass Surveillance

Societal control technology: Analytics

Statistics

- mathematical techniques for drawing general conclusions from data samples
- means, medians, distributions, samples, significance, bias
- resulting aggregates may have meaning, or not
- no hard assurances about individual inputs, only probabilities

Machine Learning

We have too much (statistical) data for humans to determine which ones have meaning, so:

- ▶ Ask computer to figure out which inputs matter!
- ▶ Different techniques:
  - ▶ Supervised learning: given example inputs and desired outputs, derive "general rule"
  - ▶ Unsupervised learning: find hidden structure in data
  - ▶ Reinforecment learning: algorithm selects actions, receives feedback based on result(s)
- ▶ Shared outcome: data in, statistical predictors out

Big Data

- "big" = too large for "standard" methods
- uses parallel-processing (CPU and data storage) – "Cloud"
- focus on decision-making based on quantitative information
- commercially use: model customers to increase sales

Cloud Analytic Building Blocks

- **Travel Patterns**
  - Travel phrases (Locations visited in given timeframe)
  - Regular/repeated visits to locations of interest
- **Behavior-Based Analytics**
  - Low use, incoming calls only
  - Excessive SIM or Handset swapping
  - Frequent Detach/Power-down
  - Courier machine learning models
- **Other Enrichments**
  - Travel on particular days of the week
  - Co-travelers
  - Similar travel patterns
  - Common contacts
  - Visits to airports
  - Other countries
  - Overnight trips
 - Permanent move

RT-RG Analytics

Meetings – who is at the same ucellid at the same time as the potential courier at the destination city?...Multiple times.


Sidekicks – is there a pair traveling together to the destination city?

74

From GSM metadata, we can measure aspects of each selector's pattern-of-life, social network, and travel behavior

This presentation describes our search for AQSL couriers using behavioral profiling

Behavioral Feature Extraction

Cross Validation Experiment on AQSL Couriers

Preliminary SIGINT Findings

Counting unique UCELLIDs shows that couriers travel more often than typical Pakistani selectors

By examining multiple features at once, we can see some indicative behaviors of our courier selectors

# Statistical algorithms are able to find the couriers at very low false alarm rates, if we're allowed to miss half of them

Random Forest Classifier

- 7 MSISDN/IMSI pairs
- Hold each pair out and then try to find them after learning how to distinguish remaining couriers fro n other Pakistanis
  (using 100k random selectors here)
- Assume that random draws of Pakistani selectors are nontargets
- 0.18% False Alarm Rate at 50% Miss Rate

better

Legend:
- Centroid(All Raw Features)
- Centroid(All Normalized Features)
- Centroid(Outgoing Raw Features)
- Centroid(Outgoing Normalized Features)
- Random Forest(All Raw Features)
- Random Forest(Outgoing Raw Features)

miss probability (%)

false alarm probability (%)

We've been experimenting with several error metrics on both small and large test sets

| Training Data	Classifier	Features	100k Test Selectors		55M Test Selectors	
			False Alarm Rate at 50% Miss Rate	Mean Reciprocal Rank	Tasked Selectors in Top 500	Tasked Selectors in Top 100
None	Random	None	50%	1/23k (simulated)	0.64 (active/Pak)	0.13 (active/Pak)
Known Couriers	Centroid	All	20%	1/18k		
		Outgoing	43%	1/27k		
	Random Forest		0.18%	1/9.9	5	1
+ Anchory Selectors			0.008%	1/14	21	6

Random Forest trained on Known Couriers + Anchory Selectors:

- 0.008% false alarm rate at 50% miss rate
- 46x improvement over random performance when evaluating its tasked precision at 100

Preliminary results indicate that we're on the right track, but much remains to be done

Cross Validation Experiment:

- Random Forest classifier operating at 0.18% false alarm rate at 50% miss
- Enhancing training data with Anchory selectors reduced that to 0.008%
- Mean Reciprocal Rank is ~1/10

Preliminary SIGINT Findings:

- Behavioral features helped discover similar selectors with "courier-like" travel patterns
- High number of tasked selectors at the top is hopefully indicative of the detector performing well "in the wild"

192 Million people live in Pakistan.

- 0.18% of the Pakistani population = 343,800 innocent citizens
- 0.008% of the Pakistani population = 15,280 innocent citizens

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This is with half of AQSL couriers surviving the genocide.

"We kill based on metadata."

—Michael Hayden (former NSA & CIA director)

The NSA mathematician's presentation only gives the percentages.

Compartmentalization

The NSA mathematician's presentation only gives the percentages.

Compartmentalization is an unconscious psychological defense mechanism used to avoid cognitive dissonance, or the mental discomfort and anxiety caused by a person's having conflicting values, cognitions, emotions, beliefs, etc. within themselves.

Societal control technology: Adaptation and Attack

> *"Angela Merkel lässt sich sehr stark von der Meinungsforschung leiten. Das zeigen Umfragen im Auftrag des Bundespresseamtes, die der SPIEGEL ausgewertet hat. Sätze der Demoskopen schafften es fast wortgleich in eine Regierungserklärung."*

```
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
angela-merkel-meinungsforscher-beeinflussen-arbeit-der-kanzlerin-
html
```

Societal control technology: Adaptation and Attack

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html
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"Germany is a digitally failed state." —Sasha Lobo

Let's look at how the US professionals do it...

The Hacking Process

1. (**R**)econnaissance

2. (**I**)nfection

3. (**C**)ommand And Control

4. (**E**)xfiltration

Reconnaissance

Publicly Available Information

(Email Address, Location, Network Info, Passwords, etc.)

Research

Hacker

Victim

Enumerate (Network)

Scan (Services)

Operating Systems

Versions

Domain Names

Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control Exfiltration

Infection

Email with Attachment or Link

Special Packets to
Exploit Services

Hacker

Victim

Use Login Credentials

Bad Web Site

Reconnaissance   Infection   Command and Control   Exfiltration

State Surveillance: Benefits and Risks

Command and Control

Push Tools and Send Commands

(Tasking, Survey, etc.)

Hacker

Victim

Beacons and Responses

Reconnaissance   Infection   **Command and Control**   Exfiltration

State Surveillance: Benefits and Risks

Exfiltration

Exfil using known and custom protocols

(Known: HTTP, SMTP, ICMP, FTP, etc)

Reconnaissance   Infection   Command and Control   **Exfiltration**

Let's look at how the IT professionals do it...

```ruby
def content(*args)
  hash = [args].flatten.first || {}

  process = hash[:process] || ["Explorer.exe\0", "Firefox.exe\0", "Chrome.exe\0"].sample
  process.encode!("US-ASCII")

  path = hash[:path] || ["C:\\Utenti\\pippo\\pedoporno.mpg", "C:\\Utenti\\pluto\\Documenti\\childporn.avi", "C:\\secrets\\bomb_
  path = path.to_utf16le_binary_null

  content = StringIO.new
  t = Time.now.getutc
  content.write [t.sec, t.min, t.hour, t.mday, t.mon, t.year, t.wday, t.yday, t.isdst ? 0 : 1].pack('l*')
  content.write process
  content.write [ 0 ].pack('L') # size hi
  content.write [ hash[:size] || 123456789 ].pack('L') # size lo
  content.write [ 0x80000000 ].pack('l') # access mode
  content.write path
  content.write [ ELEM_DELIMITER ].pack('L')
  content.string
end
```

Let's look at how the UK professionals do it...

Introducing the Joint Threat Research and Intelligence Group (JTRIG)

> *2.3 (...) Generally, the language of JTRIG's operations is characterised by terms such as "discredit", promote "distrust", "dissuade", "deceive", "disrupt", "delay", "deny", "denigrate/degrade", and "deter".*

```
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jun/
behavioural-science-support-for-jtrigs-effects.pdf
```

- "Using online techniques to make something happen in the real or cyber world"

- Two broad categories:
  - Information Ops (influence or disruption)
  - Technical disruption

- Known in GCHQ as Online Covert Action

- The 4 D's: Deny / Disrupt / Degrade / Deceive

Discredit a target

- Set up a honey-trap

- Change their photos on social networking sites

- Write a blog purporting to be one of their victims

- Email/text their colleagues, neighbours, friends etc

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Join Threat Research and Intelligence Group (JTRIG)

"3.2 Theories and research in the field of social psychology may prove particularly useful for informing JTRIG's effects and online HUMINT operations. The following topics would be particularly relevant for social influence:

- ▶ *Social cognition (including social perception and attribution)*
- ▶ *Attitudes*
- ▶ *Persuasive communications*
- ▶ *Conformity*
- ▶ *Obedience*
- ▶ *Interpersonal relationships*
- ▶ *Trust and distrust*
- ▶ *Psychological profiling*

In addition, the application of social psychological ideas to marketing and advertising would be useful." —*Behavioural Science Support for JTRIG's Effects and Online HUMINT Operations (2011)*

```
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jun/
behavioural-science-support-for-jtrigs-effects.pdf
```

Mirroring People copy each other while in social interaction with them.
- body language
- language cues
- expressions
- eye movements
- emotions

Accommodation
Adjustment of speech, patterns, and language towards another person in communications
- People in conversation tend to converge
- Depends on empathy and other personality traits
- Possibility of over-accommodation and end up looking condescending

Mimicry adoption of specific social traits by the communicator from the other participant

Question: Can I game this?

DISRUPTION
Operational Playbook

- Infiltration Operation
- Ruse Operation
- Set Piece Operation
- False Flag Operation
- False Rescue Operation
- Disruption Operation
- Sting Operation

Identifying & Exploiting fracture points

Things that push a group together

Shared opposition

Shared ideology

Common beliefs

Tension

Personal power

Pre-existing cleavages

Competition

Ideological differences

Things that pull a group apart

Gambits for Deception

Attention	Control attention Conspicuity & Expectancies	The big move covers the little move	The Target looks where you look	Attention drops at the perceived end	Repetition reduces vigilance
Perception	Mask/Mimic Eliminate - Blend Recreate - Imitate	Repackage/Invent Modify old cues Create new cues	Dazzle/Decoy Blur old cues Create alternate cues	Make the cue dynamic	Stimulate multiple sensors
Sensemaking	Exploit prior beliefs	Present story fragments	Repetition creates expectancies	Haversack Ruse (The Piece of Bad Luck)	Swap the real for the false, & vice versa
Affect	Create Cognitive Stress	Create Physiological Stress	Create Affective Stress (+/-)	Cialdini+2	Exploit shared affect
Behaviour	Simulate the action	Simulate the outcome	Time-shift perceived behaviour	Divorce behaviour from outcome	Channel behaviour

10 Principles for Influence

The Time Principle

The Need and Greed Principle

The Deception Principle

The Dishonesty Principle

The Social Compliance/ Authority Principle

The Herd Principle

The Distraction Principle

The Consistency Principle

The Reciprocity Principle

The Flattery Principle

SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

The Distraction principle

"While you are distracted by what retains your interest, hustlers can do anything to you and you won't notice."
—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Herd principle

"Even suspicious marks will let their guard down when everyone next to them appears to share the same risks. Safety in numbers? Not if they're all conspiring against you."
—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Dishonesty principle

"Anything illegal you do will be used against you by the fraudster, making it harder for you to seek help once you realize you've been had."
—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Deception princple

> *"Things and people are not what they seem. Hustlers know how to manipulate*
> *you to make you believe that they are."*
> *—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754*

The Need and Greed principle

"Your needs and desires make you vulnerable. Once hustlers know what you really want, they can easily manipulate you."
—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Time principle

"When you are under time pressure to make an important choice, you use a different decision strategy. Hustlers steer you towards a strategy involving less reasoning."
—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

The Social Compliance principle / Authority

"Society trains people not to question authority. Hustlers exploit this 'suspension of suspiciousness' to make you do what they want."
—Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson, UCAM-CL-TR-754

This is related to Cialdini's principle of persuasion on Authority:

"People respect authority. They want to follow the lead of real experts. Business titles, impressive clothing, and even driving an expensive, high-performing automobile are proven factors in lending credibility to any individual." —Dr. Robert Cialdini

Reciprocity

"The implication is you have to go first. Give something: give information, give free samples, give a positive experience to people and they will want to give you something in return." —*Dr. Robert Cialdini*

Consistency

"People do not like to back out of deals. We're more likely to do something after we've agreed to it verbally or in writing. People strive for consistency in their commitments. They also prefer to follow pre-existing attitudes, values and actions." —Dr. Robert Cialdini

Liking — The Flattery Principle (?)

"People prefer to say 'yes' to those they know and like." —*Dr. Robert Cialdini*

Map of technologies to message delivery

State Surveillance: Benefits and Risks

JTRIG "Collection" Tools

AIRWOLF Youtube profile, command and video **collection**.

BIRDSTRIKE Twitter monitoring and profile **collection**.

SPRING BISHOP **Find private** photographs of targets on Facebook.

FUSEWIRE Provides 24/7 **monitoring** of forums for target postings/online activity. Also allows **staggered postings** to be made.

BIRDSONG Automated **posting** of Twitter updates.

SYLVESTER Framework for **automated interaction** / alias management on online social networks.

JTRIG "Effects" Capabilities

CLEAN SWEEP **Masquerade** Facebook wall posts for individuals or entire countries

BOMB BAY is the capability to **increase** website hits/**rankings**.

UNDERPASS **Change outcome** of online polls

GESTATOR **amplification** of a given message, normally video, on popular multimedia websites.

PITBULL enabling **large scale delivery** of a tailored message to users of instant messaging services.

BADGER **mass delivery** of email messaging to support an information operations campaign.

WARPATH **mass delivery** of SMS messages to support an information operations campaign.

CANNONBALL is the capability to **send repeated** text messages to a single target.

BURLESQUE is the capability to **send spoofed** SMS text messages.

SCRAPHEAP CHALLENGE **Perfect spoofing** of emails from Blackberry targets

JTRIG "Effects" Capabilities

CHINESE FIRECRACKER overt **brute login** attempts against online forums.

TORNADO ALLEY delivery method that can silently extract and **run** an executable on a target's machine

SWAMP DONKEY silently locate files and **encrypt** them on a target's machine.

ANGRY PIRATE permanently **disables** target's account on their computer.

PREDATORS FACE Targeted **denial** of service against Web servers.

ROLLING THUNDER Distributed **denial** of service using P2P.

SILENT MOVIE Targeted **denial** of service against SSH servers.

VIPERS TONGUE silently **denial** of service calls on a Satellite or GSM phone

The world is interdisciplinary

- Marketing
- Politics
- Psychology
- Computer science
- Statistics
- Warfare
- Gamification
- Espionage

Five-Eye Victims

- United Nations
- European Union
- UK (listed by GCHQ as an operations area!)
- Argentina (Falklands)
- Zimbabwe ("regime change")
- Africa (listed by GCHQ as a "country")
- Leaders of colonies (Hollande, Sarkozy, Merkel)
- Amnesty International
- Greenpeace
- Journalists (Spiegel, Wikileaks)
- Torrorists (Sebastian Hahn)
- Occupy activists

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- Occupy activists
- plus 9:10 unintended targets[1]

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[1]http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-ar
2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html

Summary

GCHQ paid to train 150+ staff to perform a range of criminal acts:

- ▶ Technical: manipulate messages, censor access, spam with information
- ▶ Psychological: depriviation, emotional distress, deception, abuse of authority

with victims in other countries but also domestic to further UK political agenda:

- ▶ overthrow governments
- ▶ stiffle dissent
- ▶ provide economic advantages

SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

Full roll out complete by early 2013
150+ JTRIG and Ops staff fully trained

Mainstreaming work – push reduced
"level 1" Tradecraft to 500+ GCHQ
Analysts

"Relentlessly Optimise Training
and Tradecraft"

ocaa
Online Covert Action
Accreditation

SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

The UK merely joins the club

- ▶ Salutin Putin: inside a Russian troll house[2]
- ▶ Ukraine's new online army in media war with Russia[3]
- ▶ Congress vs BJP: The curious case of trolls and politics[4]
- ▶ China's Paid Trolls: Meet the 50-Cent Party[5]

"Das ist das Geheimnis der Propaganda; den, den die Propaganda fassen will, ganz mit den Ideen der Propaganda zu durchtränken, ohne dass er überhaupt merkt, dass er durchtränkt wird."

—*Joseph Goebbels*

"Propaganda techniques include: Using stereotypes; substituting names/labels for neutral ones; censorship or systematic selection of information; repetition; assertions without arguments; and presenting a message for and against a subject."

—*TOP SECRET JTRIG Report on Behavioural Science*

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[2]http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-house
[3]http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/ukraines-new-online-army-in-media-war-with-russia
[4]http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Congress-vs-BJP-The-curious-case-of-trolls-and-politics/articleshow/23970818.cms
[5]http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/10/china%E2%80%99s-paid-trolls-meet-50-cent-party

Cat break

Legitimacy (Reprise)

State surveillance: Benefits and Risks

Legitimacy (Reprise)

State surveillance: Benefits and Risks

So what about transnational organized crime?

Legitimacy (Reprise)

State surveillance: Benefits and Risks

So what about transnational organized crime?

Let's start with the worst.

Terrorism

- A terrorist is someone who uses violence to create fear to achieve political objectives.

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States

- Leaders of states have political objectives.

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State Terrorism

► A state using violence to achieve political objectives.
► States may use violence abroad or domestically.

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"To initiate a war of aggression [...] is the supreme international crime, only different from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of all the others. To initiate a war of aggression is a crime that no political or economic situation can justify."
    –Declaration of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, 1945.

Violence

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- Throwing entire countries into economic disarray and despair (fiscal waterboarding, overthrowing governments, causing civil war) is more cost-effective.

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What to do?

Liberty

> *"When governments fear the people, there is liberty. When the people fear the government, there is tyranny. The strongest reason for the people to retain the right to keep and* **bear arms** *is, as a last resort, to protect themselves against tyranny in government."*
>
> —*Thomas Jefferson*

Modern arms

- Offensive: surveillance- and **cracking**-tools ("Staatstrojaner")
- Defensive: privacy-enhancing technologies (encryption)

Many tools and technologies exist

- Tor
- GnuPG
- OTR+XMPP
- Pond
- GNUnet / I2P
- GNU Taler
- ...

"Hat der kapitalistische Staat die Form des Ausnahmestaats angenommen —
aufgrund der Periode und der Krise, denen dieser Staat entspricht —, so greift er
im allgemeinen in charakteristischer Weise in den ökonomischen Bereich ein, um
das System angesichts der zunehmenden Vergesellschaftung der Produktivkräfte
anzupassen und weiter funktionsfähig zu erhalten. [...]
Die relative Autonomie der Form des Ausnahmestaats gegenüber den
herrschenden Klassen und Klassenfraktionen nimmt ein besonderes Ausmaß an
und realisiert sich in höchst charakteristischer Weise; sie ist das Ergebnis der
politischen Krise und des Kräfteverhältnisses, denen diese Staatsform entspricht.
[...]
Der Ausnahmestaat ist durch eine charakteristische Modifikation des
juristischen Systems gekennzeichnet, die häufig begriffen wird als Unterschied
zwischen 'Rechtsstaat' und 'Polizeistaat'."

                              —*Nicos Poulantza, "Faschismus und Diktatur" (1970)*

*"***Obedience** *is a direct form of social influence where an individual submits to, or complies with, an authority figure. Obedience may be explained by factors such as* **diffusion of responsibility***, perception of the authority figure being* **legitimate***, and* **socialisation** *(...). (...)*
Conversely, efforts to reduce obedience may be effectively based around **educating** *people about the* **adverse consequences of compliance***; encouraging them to* **question authority***; and exposing them to* **examples of disobedience***."*

—*TOP SECRET JTRIG Report on Behavioural Science*

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AND

We MUST defund the deep state and end its wars.

Questions?

"The most unpardonable sin in society is independence of thought." –Emma Goldman