### BTI 4201: Secret sharing, symmetric key management

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Learning Objectives

Key management

Shamir Secret Sharing

Key escrow and recovery: From Shamir to Anastasis

**Threshold Signatures** 

BTI 4201: Secret sharing, symmetric key management

Part I: Key management

### Software based Personal Security Environments (PSE): PKCS#12

PKCS#12 is the most common format for software PSEs:

- PKCS#12 is a file container format used for storage and transport of private keys (and possibly certificates).
- Information is protected with a password-based symmetric key (e.g. a password).
- The security of a software PKCS#12 is based on the strength of the password protecting it.

Problem: A PKCS#12 soft-token may be copied unnoticed.

### Smartcards and Cryptotokens














## Properties of Crypto-tokens/cards



- Crypto-cards have the ability of a secure container for secret data and have an executive platform for cryptographic algorithms.
- A Crypto-card looks like a "Black Box" from the outside, where some operations can only be used over a very restrictive hard- and software interface which is able to enforce specific security policies.
- Access to sensitive data areas (i.e. private keys) is physically "impossible" from the outside.

### Example: Yubikey and Personal Identity Verification (PIV)

- Yubikey provides Smart Card functionality based on the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) interface specified in NIST SP 800-73.
- Yubikeys perform RSA or ECC sign/decrypt operations using a private key stored on the token, through common interfaces such as PKCS#11.
- Supported key sizes: RSA 2048 or ECC 256/384.
- The "universal smartcard minidriver" provides "standard smart" functionality and additional certificate and PIN management features.
- Special Yubikeys obtained FIPS 140-2 security level certification.

## Hardware Security Modules (HSM)

Common functionality:

- Secure storing and use of keys
- Random number generator
- Key pair generation
- Digital signing
- Key archiving
- Acceleration for crypto schemes

Should protect keys against:

- Mechanical attacks
- Temperature attacks
- Manipulation of voltage
- Chemical attacks



Part II: Shamir Secret Sharing

### Problem: Availability (1/3)

If you give one person a secret, it may get lost.

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 $\Rightarrow$  So give it to more than one person!

## Problem: Confidentiality (2/3)

If you give many entities a secret, it may get disclosed.

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If you give many entities a secret, it may get disclosed.

 $\Rightarrow$  So give them only a key share!

#### If you want *k* out of *n* entities to coordinate to recover a secret, there are

$$\binom{n}{k} = \frac{n!}{k!(n-k)!} \tag{1}$$

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
 $\Rightarrow$  Use polynominals!

### Polynominals

A polynomial of degree k is fully determined by k + 1 data points

 $(x_0,y_0),\ldots,(x_j,y_j),\ldots,(x_k,y_k),$ 

where no two  $x_i$  may be identical.



### Lagrange Interpolation

The interpolation polynominal in the Lagrange form is:

$$L(x) := \sum_{j=0}^k y_j \ell_j(x)$$

where

$$\ell_j(x) := \prod_{\substack{0 \le m \le k \\ m \ne j}} \frac{x - x_m}{x_j - x_m} = \frac{(x - x_0)}{(x_j - x_0)} \cdots \frac{(x - x_{j-1})}{(x_j - x_{j-1})} \frac{(x - x_{j+1})}{(x_j - x_{j+1})} \cdots \frac{(x - x_k)}{(x_j - x_k)}$$
(2)

for  $0 \le j \le k$ .

### Practical Considerations

- Our secrets will typically be integers. Calculations with floating points are messy.
- $\Rightarrow$  Use finite field arithmetic, not  $\mathbb{R}$ .

# Real world scalability

n / k	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	2	3	4	5	6
2		1	3	6	10	15
3			1	4	10	20
4				1	5	15
5					1	6
6						1

#### Other values:

▶ 
$$\binom{10}{5} = 252$$
  
▶  $\binom{20}{10} = 184756$   
▶  $\binom{30}{15} = 155117520$   
▶  $\binom{100}{50} \approx 10^{29}$ 

How many people do you have to share your secrets with?

How many people realistically participate in recovery?

### Part III: Anastasis<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>https://anastasis.lu/, based on a BFH Bachelor's thesis by D. Neufeld and D. Meister (2020) BTI 4201: Secret sharing, symmetric key management

## **THE PROBLEM**

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Confidentiality requires only consumer is in control of key material



o Consumers are unable to simultaneously ensure ار



Cryptographic key-splitting solutions so far are not usable



European e-money issuers using electronic wallets must:<sup>1</sup>

- Enable consumers to always recover their electronic funds (i.e. if devices are lost)
- Not assume consumers are able to remember or securely preserve key material

<sup>1</sup>According to communication from ECB to Taler Systems SA.



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
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
### WHAT IS ANASTASIS? ANASTASIS IS A KEY RECOVERY SERVICE.

·	Users split their secret keys across multiple service providers
****	Service providers learn nothing about the user, except possibly some details about how to authenticate the user
MacBook Air	Only the authorized user can recover the key by following standard authentication procedures (SMS TAN, Video-Ident, Security Question, eMail, etc.)
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## **OVERVIEW**



STEP 1: RECOVERY INFORMATION



STEP 2: SPLIT RECOVERY INFORMATION











STEP 3: USER IDENTIFICATION




STEP 4: KEY DERIVATION




SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW STEP 5: ENCRYPT PARTS




SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW STEP 6: ADD TRUTH



SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW STEP 7: ENCRYPT TRUTH







STEP 9: USER IDENTIFICATION




STEP 10: KEY DERIVATION




SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW STEP 11: PROVIDE KEY



**SIMPLIFIED PROVIDER A** PROCESS **FLOW** DECRYPT TRUTH PROVIDER C





SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW STEP 13: AUTHENTICATION



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SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW STEP 14: RECEIVE PARTS






# **SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW** STEP 16: REASSEMBLY

# SIMPLIFICATIONS

THE PREVIOUS ILLUSTRATION MAKES VARIOUS SIMPLIFICATIONS



## **UNIQUE SALES PROPOSITIONS (USPS)**

Distributed trust instead of single point of failure

Maximum privacy with respect to authentication data



🔼 Ease of use

Low cost, scalable cloudbased solution

Generic API suitable for a range of applications

Customers can remain



 Minimizes risk to Anastasis service provider in case database is exposed

· Makes it more difficult for attackers to fool authentication procedure



Transparent, Free Software solution

E-money issuer does not have to protect consumer data against its own staff and can respect consumer privacy

## **SOCIAL IMPACT OF ANASTASIS**



Low-cost solution with minimal environmental impact



Increases informational selfdetermination by keeping consumers in control of their data



Free Software contributes to the global Commons

# 

#### REVENUE

- E-money issuers pay Anastasis UG to offer service to consumers with wallets to satisfy their regulatory requirements (service must exist)
- Wallet operators pay Anastasis UG to assist with technical integration
- Consumers pay Anastasis UG for safekeeping and/or recovery (subscription)

#### EXPENSES

- Development and operations (staff costs)
- Server infrastructure

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**OPERATING** 

MODEL





Electronic wallets for blockchain wallets and/or fiat currencies



Key store for communication keys, such as OpenPGP or X.509



Identity management solutions



Password managers and disk encryption key material (\*)

# MAIN RISKS AND MITIGATIONS


**IMPLEMENTATION RISK** Straightforward design simplifies work

**INFORMATION SECURITY RISK** Privacy-by-design minimizes loss

**DISTRIBUTION ON CUSTOMER SIDE** Strong partners with implementation need

CASH FLOW Cloud-based deployment with outsourcing of procedures that amortize only at scale





Demo

#### Part IV: FROST & Frosix<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Based on work by Joel Urech BTI 4201: Secret sharing, symmetric key management Alice wants to create a cryptographic signature, but:

- No single piece of hardware is trusted
- No single service provider is trusted

But: Using *t* independent signature service providers might be ok!

If we need t providers, we probably should initially sign up with n providers so that we can still create signatures if only t/n are available...

# FROST [1]

Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold (FROST) is a *t*-out-of-*n* threshold signature scheme:


- Distributed key generation protocol can be used to ensure private key is never stored on a single device
- ▶ *t* providers required to collaborate to create digital signature

### FROSIX

Free Software implementation for threshold signatures using FROST with:

- RESTful API to interact between signer and signing services
- Configurable authentication methods to authorize creation of signature
- Client should still use multiple devices (for authorization and to check distributed key generation) to avoid single point of failure
- Command-line tool to interact with FROSIX service providers

#### System components overview



### FROSIX: Future Work

Open issues:

- Support additional signature schemes beyond EdDSA
- Pay signature service providers for their service
- Graphical user interfaces (Gtk+, WebUI, ...)

### References I

Deirdre Connolly, Chelsea Komlo, Ian Goldberg, and Christopher A. Wood. Two-round threshold schnorr signatures with frost. Technical report, IRTF, 2023. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-frost/.